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The Problem of Senegambia 
b y P E T E R R O B S O N * 
T H E last few years have been notable in Afr ica for the many attempts 
which have been m a d e to bring about economic integration, on the one 
hand through political regroupings, on the other by various kinds of 
economic associations between fully sovereign states. A t present, the 
number o f ' polit ical ' integrations is small. O n e of the most important 
recent examples, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, was 
broken u p in 1963 after a life o f t e n years. T h e Federations in former 
French West and Equatorial Afr ica did not survive the independence 
of their constituent territories. In fact, about the only examples of this 
kind of integration at present are Gameroun, Somalia, and Ethiopia-
Eritrea. 
O n the other hand, examples of economic integration between 
independent states are m u c h more numerous. Instances are the East 
Afr ican C o m m o n Market , the Central Afr ican Economic Union, and 
the (French) West Afr ican Monetary U n i o n . 1 Several others are being 
actively discussed, such as the West Afr ican Free T r a d e A r e a , which 
would cover Sierra Leone, Guinea, Liberia, and Ivory Coast. Several 
interesting questions arise in relation to these experiments. H o w 
important are the economic gains ? C a n economic association without 
some kind of political union produce an optimal pattern of economic 
development? C a n economic association survive without some degree 
of political uni ty? Is economic association likely to develop into some 
kind of political association ? T h e last question is of particular interest 
to Pan-Africanists. A general answer to these questions is unlikely 
to be found, but the experience of particular experiments m a y provide 
useful indicators. Given the importance of the issue of economic 
integration in present-day Africa, it is in any case vital that the problems 
and experience of economic integration should receive as wide a dis-
cussion as possible. This article discusses some recent aspects of the 
attempt, so far unsuccessful, to bring about some form of association 
between Senegal and G a m b i a , sometimes referred to as Senegambia. 2 
* Professor of Economics, University College, Nairobi. 
1 This M o n e t a r y U n i o n currently includes Ivory Coast, D a h o m e y , U p p e r V o l t a , M a u r i -
tania, Niger, and Senegal. Its currency is the C . F . A . franc (Communaute financiere africaine) 
which is freely convertible into French francs. 
2 Senegambia, including m u c h of w h a t is now G a m b i a and Senegal, was the name of a 
British colony which existed from 1765 to 1783. 
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It is concerned mainly with economic aspects because, in this instance, 
it appears that co-operation in defence and foreign policy apart, the 
chances of any closer association, freely entered into both sides, will 
turn largely on economic issues. 
# 
T h e m a p serves to indicate w h y the question of some form of as-
sociation between Senegal and G a m b i a has recently arisen. G a m b i a 
is an extreme example of a territory which owes its existence entirely 
to colonial policy. It forms an intrusion into the much larger country 
of Senegal, stretching from the coast inland along both sides of the 
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G a m b i a river, and making up a strip about 200 miles long and 12-20 
miles wide. A l though roughly following the course of the river, it does 
not extend to the natural limits of the basin on either side, nor does it 
reach the source, which lies in Guinea. T h e frontiers of G a m b i a cut 
through both natural features and h u m a n settlement patterns. Whol ly 
surrounded by Senegal except on its seaward margin, G a m b i a largely 
isolates the southern region of Gasamance from the rest of Senegal. 
Ethnically the people of G a m b i a and Senegal are the same. A t the 
same time the two countries have for a long period been subjected to 
the influence of two quite different colonial systems. This has created 
divergences in administrative as well as cultural and economic patterns 
which are important obstacles to a closer association of the two countries. 
It is however felt by many that a situation in which these countries 
are completely independent of each other has important disadvantages 
for both. T h r e e main considerations seem to have led during the last 
few years to an active discussion of a closer relationship between them. 
T h e first is doubt as to whether G a m b i a by itself is economically viable. 
A t present it has a budget deficit and is dependent upon a substantial 
grant-in-aid from the U . K . T h e second is the view that the present 
economic frontiers are disadvantageous to both countries. For Senegal 
it means a partial isolation of the southern province of Casamance and 
an inability fully to use the G a m b i a river. For G a m b i a it is argued that 
it cannot exploit its main natural asset, which is the river basin, and that 
Bathurst is deprived of the opportunity to serve as the port for a large 
economic area to which its natural position entitles it. In short, it is 
argued that it is impossible to make adequate use of the economic 
resources of G a m b i a and Senegal without close co-operation, which is 
hindered by political and economic frontiers. A third reason for seeking 
association is political. T h e r e is some fear in Senegal that G a m b i a 
could become a base for the operations of banned political parties or 
for subversion from outside. For its part, G a m b i a , which lacks an army, 
recognises that the country could be taken by force in a day, were 
Senegal disposed to do so, and there is little disposition to rely on the 
willingness or ability of the U . N . or the British Government to prevent 
or reverse such an operation. 
T h e possibilities of association began to be explored towards the end 
of 1961, when the two countries established an inter-ministerial com-
mittee to discuss matters of joint interest. A m o n g other things this 
committee considered such matters as posts, telecommunications, and 
feeder roads. It was not particularly successful. Subsequently, the two 
Governments discussed the possibility that when G a m b i a achieved 
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independence some form of association between their two countries 
might be entered into. In these talks the Gambian Government made 
it clear that it would only consider association on terms which would 
guarantee it a high degree of autonomy in internal af fairs—which 
amounted in effect to a willingness to consider only a weak confederal 
relationship. These talks led to the commissioning from the United 
Nations of a report to consider the various possibilities of association. 
T o help matters along, the U . K . Government indicated that no dis-
cussions on Gambian independence would be entertained until the 
Governments of Senegal and G a m b i a had considered its recommen-
dations. T h e report and subsequent developments are considered in 
later sections of this article. 
T H E E C O N O M I E S O F S E N E G A L A N D G A M B I A 
Since the motives for considering association were largely economic, 
a brief review of some salient economic features of the two countries 
is required. Table 1 summarises some of the relevant data. 
From the standpoint of size, the two countries are very different. 
Senegal is much larger in population and area. In terms of basic 
economic structure, however, the two countries are very similar. Both 
T A B L E I 
Economic Features: 1962 Gambia Senegal 
Area: sq. miles 3,978 77,060 
Population 300,000 3,000,000 
Rate of population increase 2.3 per cent per annum 
Density of population per sq. mile 75 39 
Gross Domestic Product £9,000,000! £i67,ooo,ooo2 
G.D.P. per head £30 £562 
Total exports £3,232,000 £43,9
84,c>oo2 
Groundnut produce as percentage 
of total exports3 95 81 
Exports per head £10 £i52 
Balance of trade -£1,158,000 -£ io ,76o,ooo 2 
Current budget revenue balance -£449,000 
1 This figure is based on calculations of the Economic Adviser, since no detailed estimates 
are available. 
2 G . F . A . francs have been converted to sterling at the official rate of exchange of 696 to £1. 
T h e C . F . A . franc, however, is overvalued, and this should be borne in mind in comparing 
these figures. 
3 In Gambia , only groundnuts are exported; but in Senegal, shelled groundnuts and oil 
are of roughly equal importance. 
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are essentially mono-crop agricultural economies which rely mainly, 
in the commercialised sector, upon groundnut products. Both have a 
trade deficit. In both the greater part of the population is engaged in 
agriculture. T h e r e is a small nucleus of industrial development in 
Senegal which dates from the days when D a k a r was the capital of the 
Federation de VAfrique occidental frangaise ( A . O . F . ) and its products 
circulated freely throughout the area. This is no longer the case, though 
about 30 per cent of Senegal's exports still go to her former fellow 
m e m b e r s — m a i n l y food, drink, tobacco, and consumer goods of various 
kinds. 
A l though they are so very similar in basic structure and resources, 
the two economies are organised on very different bases. T h e differences 
manifest themselves in the first place in foreign trade policy. In Senegal 
a protectionist and discriminatory policy is followed, and import 
charges are high. Gambia ' s policy is liberal and non-discriminatory, 
and import charges are relatively low. 
T h u s in Senegal a complex system of fiscal, customs, and other 
import duties produced in 1962 an average rate of duty of well over 
30 per cent, despite the exclusion of a large part of imports from 
customs duties, which are normally in the range 5 - 1 5 per cent. A p a r t 
from this, imports are generally controlled by a system of licensing. 
Goods from France m a y be imported without either restriction or 
licence, and being exempted from customs duties they enjoy a sub-
stantial preference margin. Also, Senegal binds itself to b u y from 
France a certain m i n i m u m total value of goods and m i n i m u m propor-
tions of important types of imports. In most cases these proportions 
exceed 50 per cent. Partly as a result of these arrangements, France is 
Senegal's chief supplier, providing in 1962 about two-thirds of her 
imports. Ult imately, goods from all E . E . C . countries will enter on 
level terms as a result of Senegal's association with the C o m m u n i t y , and 
this should bring about some increased diversity in import sources. 
For its part, France provides preferential markets for Senegal's 
products. A market for a large part of its groundnut output is guaran-
teed, and until recently the price paid was about 25 per cent higher than 
world market prices, representing a subsidy of 8,000 m. francs C . F . A . 
U n d e r the E . E . C . association agreement this subsidy will disappear. In 
1962 85 per cent of Senegal 's exports went to France. 
By contrast with Senegal, G a m b i a has a very liberal import policy. 
Goods m a y be imported from most countries under freely granted open 
general licences. C o m p a r e d to Senegal, import charges are relatively 
low. Dur ing 1960-62 the average rate of duty on all imports, including 
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a four per cent purchase tax, was about 20 per cent. T h e tariff is non-
discriminatory except for a Commonweal th preference margin, which on 
most goods is very small. Gambia ' s liberal import policy enables it to 
obtain supplies from the cheapest source and it is one of the factors which 
accounts for the marked difference in the cost of living between the 
two countries. In 1962 about 40 per cent of Gambia 's imports came 
from the U . K . 
A second important difference between the two countries is that 
there is a substantial difference in both the structure and the general 
level of internal prices. A number of goods are relatively expensive 
in Senegal, due in part to restrictions on the sources of imports and in 
part to relatively high tariffs. A t the same time the general level of 
prices is higher in Senegal, in part due to over-valuation of the West 
Afr ican C . F . A . franc. Thus , food prices are estimated to be u p to 100 
per cent higher in D a k a r than Bathurst, wages up to 80 per cent higher, 
and in general the cost of living to be 50 per cent higher. 
Given these differences and the difficulty of policing the frontier, it is 
not surprising that there is a good deal of smuggling from G a m b i a to 
Senegal. In M a r c h 1960 an unofficial French estimate put the value of 
smuggled goods (c.i.f. Bathurst) at over £500,000, or £700,000 including 
customs duties and profit margins. A similar G a m b i a n estimate broadly 
confirms this. Goods imported into G a m b i a and subsequently smuggled 
into Senegal therefore represent about 10 per cent of G a m b i a n imports 
and produce about 15 per cent of Gambia ' s total revenue from import 
duty. For some categories of goods, for which price differences are very 
large, it is estimated that a very high proportion is transferred—up to 
80 per cent for tobacco, 50 per cent for textiles and 60-70 per cent for 
shoes. Smuggl ing is thus quite important to the G a m b i a n economy. 
By contrast, legitimate trade between the two countries is negligible. 
O n the other hand, although Senegal complains about smuggling, 
it is of relatively small importance to her. Smuggled imports amount to 
less than one per cent of total imports. T h e value of customs duties lost 
by Senegal has been estimated at 250 m. francs, which is, currently, 
about one per cent of total budget revenue or two per cent of revenue 
from import duties. 
T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S R E P O R T 
Early in 1964 the commissioned U . N . report was submitted, dealing 
with constitutional, economic, and fiscal aspects of association.1 I t was 
1 United Nations, Report on the Alternatives of Association between the Gambia and Senegal (New 
Y o r k , 1964); also published by the Government of G a m b i a as Sessional Paper .No. 13 of 1364 
(Bathurst) 
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followed by a supplementary report by the F . A . O . on integrated 
agricultural development in the G a m b i a river basin. 1 
O n the question of the constitutional form which association between 
G a m b i a and Senegal might take, the U . N . report outlines three alter-
natives. T h e first is the integration of G a m b i a as the eighth Senegalese 
or Senegambian province. This is ruled out as unacceptable to G a m b i a 
and not to be entertained ' until a long period of friendly and fruitful 
collaboration between the two countries has elapsed' . 
T h e second possibility is a Senegambian federation. T h e report 
envisages a federal government with powers for the initial period 
limited to defence and overseas representation, and with complete 
autonomy in other respects for the federated states. Progress thereafter 
would depend on the wishes of both states. T h e authors of the report 
clearly favour this alternative, but evidently doubt whether a precon-
d i t i o n — a will to create and maintain such a federation a m o n g leaders 
and the electorate—is fulfilled in G a m b i a . 
T h e third a l ternat ive—the establishment of a Senegambian entente— 
would not involve the creation of a new state and both countries would 
remain fully sovereign. T h e report favours this only if the outlined 
federal solution is considered premature: ' T h e solution of a mere 
entente accordingly remains . . . more a means to an end; it is a means of 
preparing for the future, of laying the foundations for an initial co-
operation, than of expanding that co-operation in many matters and 
so of impressing on both sides the need for an association of the federal 
type. ' I t is therefore a merely transitional solution. In its recommen-
dations, however, the report recognises that in the constitutional and 
legislative field it m a y not be practicable to go beyond the establishment 
of a treaty relationship. This judgement , which events have so far 
borne out, is the background to the economic aspects of the problem 
considered here. 
In economic as in constitutional matters it is also possible to conceive 
of a number of alternatives, ranging from complete integrat ion— 
probably feasible only with political u n i t y — t o various degrees of asso-
ciation which might be compatible with an absence of any formal 
political links. 
T h e possibility of full economic integration is considered in the report 
only briefly, since political integration, which would be a precondition, 
is ruled out as unfeasible. T h e report suggests that it would have two 
main advantages. First, with French concurrence, G a m b i a could 
1 Food and Agricultural Organisation, A Report to the Governments of Gambia and Senegal: 
integrated agricultural development in the Gambia River Basin (Rome, 1964). 
27 
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benefit from French guarantees and preferential markets for ground-
nuts. But preferences are of diminishing importance as France reduces 
its support prices to the free market level as required by E . E . C . 
Secondly, G a m b i a could as part of Senegal presumably expect to enjoy 
the status of an associated overseas territory. But this is also largely 
irrelevant since, following the precedent set by Nigeria, G a m b i a could 
expect to be able to negotiate an association agreement. This is of some 
potential importance since, although Gambia ' s main export at present 
enters E . E . C . duty free, its Development Plan indicates that G a m b i a 
intends to process an increasing proportion of its groundnut crop into 
oil. O n present plans in E . E . C . , groundnut oil from non-associates will 
face a 10-15 per cent tariff by 1970. O f course, as part of Senegal, 
G a m b i a might expect to benefit from financial assistance from the 
Development Fund of the Six. This would not otherwise be available. 
But even if it were politically practicable, immediate economic 
integration would give rise to m a n y problems. In the first place, the 
complicated regulatory system of Senegal could hardly be applied 
overnight because of the shortage of qualified staff. It is significant 
that in the Federal Republ ic of Cameroun there is still not full inte-
gration of customs duties, even after four years of federation. Even if 
such a change were administratively practicable, the resulting rise in 
the cost of living would involve hardship in G a m b i a . For these and 
other reasons, the U . N . report therefore advocates a gradual economic 
association of the two countries, beginning first with areas in which 
agreement is easy to reach and gradually building up to a more advanced 
form of association. T h e view is taken that a developing economic 
association will promote a gradual rapprochement in constitutional and 
legislative matters. 
I t is suggested that the first essential move towards economic inte-
gration should be to abolish customs frontiers, which are difficult to 
police properly, and which involve Senegal in communications and 
transport difficulties with the Casamance. Since immediate unification 
is ruled out for the reasons just stated, a device is proposed which would 
make possible the abolition of the customs frontier without the need for 
immediate tariff unification. I t amounts basically to a transitional 
free trade area with import restrictions in G a m b i a . Customs frontiers 
would be abolished and G a m b i a given an over-all import quota, based 
on recent import levels, to which reduced rates of duty would apply, 
corresponding initially to the rates hitherto levied. Special quotas 
would be laid down within the over-all limit to cover the items in w h i c h 
there is most smuggling at present, namely, textiles, cigarettes, tobacco, 
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shoes, and matches. T h e Governments should agree on the stages by 
which the tariff should subsequently be unified. 
T h e report suggests that this arrangement woul i not affect G a m b i a ' s 
revenue during the transition and that, as G a m b i a n tariffs come into 
line, revenue should eventually increase. Senegal would continue to 
lose some revenue from smuggling but would gain from not having 
to police the frontier. This is the main economic recommendation to 
emerge from the U . N . report. 
O n monetary matters the report expresses the view that ultimately 
the currencies would have to be unified, but this is not regarded as 
pressing. As already mentioned, Senegal is not autonomous in the 
monetary field but forms part of the West Afr ican M o n e t a r y Union. 
T h e implications of this, of the overvaluation of the G . F . A . franc and 
of its possible—or at least rumoured—devaluat ion are not discussed. 
A D V A N T A G E S O F E C O N O M I C I N T E G R A T I O N I N S E N E G A M B I A 
Like many other recent reports on integration, this one largely took 
for granted that a customs union would be a good thing for all. But 
theory and experience both suggest that whether a small territory like 
G a m b i a would benefit would depend on ' b a c k w a s h ' and ' s p r e a d ' 
effects, 1 the balance of w h i c h on general grounds can be expected to be 
unfavourable. A positive gain to the small territory will, very likely, 
depend upon negotiated benefits in such fields as fiscal compensation, 
industrial development, labour movements, and so on. I t would be 
more practical to negotiate these as an integral part of a deal about 
customs than separately. T h e possibility that G a m b i a m a y be better 
favoured than some other small territories, inasmuch as the G a m b i a 
river m a y form a potential natural growth point, is hardly a reason 
for not doing so. 
W h a t in fact are the specific gains anticipated from integration ? In 
the first place it is suggested that the river could be used to bring down 
the Senegal groundnut crop for export. T h e U . N . report quotes esti-
mates that this could save Senegal 1 - 3 francs per kilo on groundnuts. 
O n a crop of 80,000 tons this would come to between 80 and 240m. 
francs {-£120-^360,000). W h a t is not clear is that this gain is necessarily 
bound up with the abolition of the frontier. M a n y countries use the 
transport networks of others, even in Afr ica, without unifying tariffs. 
T h e expanded use of the river would, of course, be made easier if the 
1 For a useful discussion of these effects, see G . Myrdal , Economic Theory and Under-developed 
Regions (London, 1963 edn.). 
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price policies of the two marketing boards, the Agricultural Market ing 
Board in Senegal and the G a m b i a Oilseeds Market ing Board, were 
fully harmonised. This should not present any great difficulties w h e n 
the French subsidy disappears. 
Another field to which much importance has been attached in the 
debate on closer association concerns the integrated development of the 
G a m b i a river basin in relation to irrigation and hydrological develop-
ment. This is dealt with at length in the F . A . O . report. Construction 
of a storage dam in the upper catchment area of the G a m b i a river, for 
instance, would make it possible to irrigate about 100,000 acres in the 
middle reaches, to protect 160,000 acres of potential rice land in the 
estuary, and to improve conditions for another 160,000 acres. I t would 
also be possible to generate several hundred million kwh. of elec-
tricity. 
T h e economic, as opposed to the technical, feasibility of all this of course 
has yet to be determined. A labour supply to undertake the intensive 
cultivation of the additional acres would be very difficult to obtain unless 
the returns were very high, so long as land continues to be readily 
available in these countries. For the additional electricity, a market 
just does not exist. Finance of the order required will certainly not be 
readily forthcoming and will in any case depend on prior feasibility 
studies. Right ly therefore the F . A . O . report regards these as very long-
term possibilities and concludes that few effects could be expected for 
at least ten years. 
Again , it is not clear that the proposed development hinges on a 
substantial measure of market integration, still less on a customs union. 
In other parts of Africa, important initiatives are being taken in river 
basin development by inter-governmental authorities—as with the 
C h a d and Niger basins,1 and the M o n o basin (which concerns T o g o and 
D a h o m e y ) . As a matter of fact, Senegal itself already participates, 
together with Guinea, M a l i , and Mauri tania , in an inter-governmental 
committee which is concerned with the improvement of the Senegal 
river, the building of a dam, and other matters. A basic convention 
was recently submitted to the participating Governments for ratification. 
A n inter-governmental G a m b i a river authority could probably go a 
long w a y in advancing the development outlined in the F . A . O . report 
without either political or market integration. O f course, schemes 
whose economic viability depends on overstepping frontiers have been 
traditionally difficult to finance from international agencies and other 
aid providers. This is, however, one of the problems which the recently 
1 See U . N . E . G . A . , Natural Resources Newsletter (Addis Ababa) , 5, 1965. 
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established Afr ican Development Bank was specifically designed to 
deal with. 
Other possible short-term measures of resource development include 
groundnut production, diversification of upland crops, and an expansion 
of rice production. Few of these proposals seem to depend on a customs 
union for their implementation. 
T h e main institutional proposal of the U . N . report in the economic 
field is for a transitional free trade area with quotas, aiming at a unified 
external tariff. T h e implications of this, regrettably, receive little 
analysis. Y e t even a brief consideration of the proposition suggests 
that, whatever its merits for Senegal, it has little to commend it to 
G a m b i a . 
In the first place, despite the optimism of the report the arrangement is 
likely to be difficult to administer and to produce pricing problems for 
G a m b i a . N o doubt imports through Bathurst could be readily con-
trolled; but without a rationing system the incentive to divert quota 
goods to Senegal would be considerable. A rationing system would 
throw increased costs of administration on G a m b i a ; without it, a sharp 
rise in living costs could be expected. W h a t happens w h e n the quotas 
are exhausted ? W o u l d additional imports bear the full burden of the 
higher Senegal tariff? W o u l d the proposal even be consistent with 
G . A . T . T . ? 
M o r e important, the consequences of full tariff al ignment must 
inevitably be a shift towards the products of Senegal, which already 
possesses industries producing phosphates, tinned goods, cement and 
building materials, cigarettes, beer, soap, shoes, textiles, and thermo-
electric power. This shift would gradually involve a loss of revenue for 
G a m b i a as rising prices and tariffs made an increasing range of Senegal 
industry competitive in G a m b i a . T h e implications of this should have 
been examined in the report, which instead facilely suggests that 
revenue will increase as customs duties are unified. 
In short, it is not evident that many of the more important economic 
gains looked for in the report depend on a customs union. Moreover 
this is almost certain to involve G a m b i a in revenue losses. T h e tran-
sitional proposals seem likely to be difficult to administer and the burden 
would fall on G a m b i a . 
T h e r e are, however, two alternative possibilities of which surprisingly 
no mention is made in the report, possibly because of its preoccupation 
with smuggling and the administrative savings from abolishing the 
customs frontier. Both of these other possibilities would require the 
maintenance of customs frontiers, but otherwise they would permit a 
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substantial measure of economic integration in most of the areas dis-
cussed in the report, with advantage to both sides. 
T h e first of these possibilities is a simple free trade area which would 
permit each country to maintain its own tariffs against the rest of the 
wor ld; but local products would be freely exchanged, without restric-
tions or duties, and so would local manufactures, subject to tax on 
their import content. A similar free trade area (with the East Afr ican 
common market) was once suggested for Zanzibar , whose economic 
problems before its union with T a n g a n y i k a had many similarities with 
those of G a m b i a — a local market too small to attract industry, a rela-
tively low tariff, and heavy reliance on customs as a source of revenue. 1 
Such a free trade area should be of benefit to both sides. I t would 
permit most of the gains from agricultural integration to be achieved. 
For instance, groundnuts from each area could go to the nearest decor-
ticating plant, making possible savings in transport costs and more 
effective utilisation of capacity. Also it would be easier to expand the 
use of the G a m b i a river as a transport artery. This kind of free trade 
area would require internal customs checks to be maintained and it 
would not eliminate the incentive to smuggle from one to the other 
the products of outside countries. But even the U . N . proposal involves 
accepting the continuance of smuggling for a transitional period. I n 
any event, as has been seen, smuggling is confined to a limited number 
of articles which have a high duty and are portable. Finally, a free 
trade area does seem to be the solution to which many other countries 
in Afr ica are turning. I t might therefore offer G a m b i a the more attractive 
prospect of integration within a larger grouping. 
A free trade area in local products for Senegambia might conceivably 
require some changes in taxation in G a m b i a . For instance, since Senegal 
cigarettes might well displace imports, to avoid a large revenue loss a 
consumption tax might have to be imposed. In other directions, how-
ever, the present smuggling trade and other factors suggest that, while 
tariff differences remain, Senegalese manufactures would be unlikely to 
displace imports for G a m b i a . Attention would also have to be given in 
the longer run to internal fiscal harmonisation if full advantage were to 
be taken of the opportunities presented by the wider market area. 
I f for any reason a free trade in all local products were not acceptable 
to either country, yet another alternative would be to institute a free 
trade area in local agricultural produce only. This again, on a wider 
Afr ican plane, is strongly advocated by the U . N . Economic Commission 
for Afr ica as a first, most important, and practicable step towards the 
1 See Report on the Economic Development of Zanzibar (Zanzibar, 1962), pp. 9-10. 
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establishment of an Afr ican common market. Such an agreement 
might later be supplemented by ad hoc agreements for free trade in 
certain industrial products as co-operation develops. 
Either of the arrangements just outlined could be accepted by G a m b i a 
with a reasonable expectation that they would lead to long-term ad-
vantages and no immediate disadvantages. But the U . N . proposals 
offer G a m b i a no obvious advantages and some evident immediate dis-
advantages in the form of higher administrative costs. I t would not be 
sensible to accept them without some reconsideration of the direct costs 
and benefits of the change-over to the two countries, or without collateral 
agreements in other fields. 
R E G E N T D E V E L O P M E N T S 
Developments since the consideration of the U . N . report by the two 
Governments do not justify any strong hope that substantial measures for 
closer association are likely in the near future, even in the economic 
field, unless some new proposals are produced. Fol lowing the U . N . 
report in M a r c h 1964, talks between the two Governments were held in 
D a k a r in M a y . A t these meetings the Gambians put forward proposals 
on the political s i d e — v e r y similar to the third alternative mentioned in 
the r e p o r t — w h i c h envisaged a confederal structure with responsibility 
for defence, foreign affairs, and overseas representation. This was not 
acceptable to Senegal, which appears to have countered with proposals 
envisaging the eventual integration of G a m b i a into Senegal. This in 
turn was not acceptable to G a m b i a , and eventually it was decided by 
the two Governments to enter into agreements only on foreign affairs 
and defence. 
T h e defence agreement provides for mutual assistance to secure 
external security and defence against any form of threat, the establish-
ment of a jo int Senegal-Gambia defence committee with a permanent 
secretariat, and Senegalese assistance in training any G a m b i a n military 
or para-military units. T h e foreign policy agreement provides for an 
exchange of resident ministers, representation of G a m b i a by Senegal 
as directed by G a m b i a , and a joint committee on foreign affairs with a 
secretariat which will meet once every three months to harmonise the 
approaches of the parties to all matters of importance in foreign affairs. 1 
These agreements provide useful organs for co-operation but do not 
appear to diminish the sovereignty of either country to any important 
extent. 
1 See Prime Minister's Speech at Opening Session of House of Representatives on 1 July 
1964, in Gambia Mews Bulletin (Bathurst), 9 July 1964. 
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O n the economic side the G a m b i a n Government has not accepted 
the proposals for a transitional free trade area with quotas. Its view 
is that levels of taxation and import duties should be gradually assimi-
lated, but that there should be countervail ing benefits in the form of 
increased trade and economic activity in G a m b i a . 1 A t another level, 
however, its current development programme does provide for various 
developments to facilitate closer association with Senegal, including the 
possible introduction of the metric system and a change in the rule of 
the road. 
A n assessment of the factors which have contributed to a failure 
to make more substantial advances in the direction of closer association 
is hampered by the absence of public discussion in Senegal, where the 
matter has not even been debated in the Assembly. I t appears, however, 
that the Senegal view has been that any acceptable form of economic 
association must lead in the not-too-distant future to the full integration 
of G a m b i a . I t is not clear whether, subject to this, the transitional free 
trade area advocated by the U . N . report would have been acceptable. 
A federal arrangement with substantial autonomy for G a m b i a would 
not be acceptable to the Senegal leaders at present. For this view, 
political factors, including the problem of the Casamance and ex-
perience with the abortive M a l i Federation, appear to account. But it 
is hard to see w h a t valid objections there would be from Senegal to 
some form of purely economic association, outside a political link, 
unless it is j u d g e d that this might postpone a close political link which 
would otherwise materialise rapidly. 
But this is an unrealistic judgement . G a m b i a is not interested in 
becoming a province of Senegal. T h e r e is certainly a feeling a m o n g the 
Bathurst t^lite that some kind of economic association could be in 
G a m b i a ' s interests, but that even this may be undesirable as long as 
the Senegalese economy is highly regulated. Also, there is in Bathurst 
a realistic awareness of Senegal's political concern with G a m b i a . It is, 
of course, this aspect which the defence and foreign policy agreements 
were intended to cover. 
In this situation, in which Senegal seems committed to integration 
and G a m b i a to substantial autonomy, and in which there appear to 
be no major economic benefits to be expected by the latter from the 
present proposals for economic integration, at least in the medium run, 
the status quo could well continue indefinitely in the absence of new 
initiatives. W i t h the defence agreements concluded, Senegal seems 
prepared to see G a m b i a ' g o it a lone ' , confident that she will see the 
1 See Gambia News Bulletin, 9 July 1964. 
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advantages of closer association in the long run. T h a t this m a y be an 
optimistic view is suggested by the many examples of the difficulties of 
bringing about closer union after lines of separate development have 
been allowed to harden. 
T w o factors might dramatical ly change the situation. Despite the 
defence agreements, a political situation could conceivably develop 
in which Senegal felt compelled to take over G a m b i a , and it is doubtful 
whether effective resistance would be possible. So long as the present 
level-headed groups continue to wield effective power this eventuality 
seems remote. T h e other possibility is that the British Government 
might taper off its substantial financial assistance, in which case G a m b i a 
might be forced to reappraise the situation. A g a i n this seems a remote 
possibility. 
In the longer run, if free-trade agreements become more widespread 
in Afr ica, Senegal might be disposed to think about the wisdom of 
extending this more attractive alternative to G a m b i a . I f she does, 
there will be little reason for G a m b i a to oppose an arrangement of 
this kind. 
